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INTRODUCTION

On this twenty-fifth anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky,' it is unsettling to
observe that so many consider the decision a failure in terms of its apparent
purpose-to remedy and prevent discrimination in jury selection.2
According to numerous commentators, the elimination of potential jurors
on the basis of race and gender is a daily occurrence in courtrooms across
the country, and despite Batson's ruling to the contrary, largely nothing is
done about it.3
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by
Questionnaire and the "Blind"Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1o9 (1996) ("[C]ase
studies... tell us ... that Batson's requirement of articulating a neutral explanation for suspect
peremptory challenges creates no substantial hurdle for 'those ... who are of a mind to
discriminate,' let alone for those who discriminate unconsciously." (third alteration in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96)); Bidish Sarma, Commentary, When Will
Race No Longer Matter inJury Selection?, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 69, 69 (201 1),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/o9/sarma2.pdf ("The evidence that district
attorneys still exclude minorities because of their race is so compelling that it is tempting to
assume that race will always factor into lawyers' decisions about whom to keep on the jury and
whom to exclude."); Jason Riley, Blacks Being Excluded from Louisville Juries, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.) (Nov. 6, 2005), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20051 i o6/NEWSoi/
the
grossly
on
(reporting
511 o6o 4 8 3 /Blacks-being-excluded-from-Louisville-juies
disproportionate exclusion of African Americans at every phase ofjury selection in the state in
which Batson originated); see also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned
About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 483 (1996) ("A system
which, like the current one created by Batson, seeks to accommodate both the inherent
[unfettered] aspects of the peremptory challenge and the scrutiny of anti-discrimination laws is
one ... which either does not exist or is impossible to locate."); Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M.
Steiker, Report to the ALl Concerning CapitalPunishment (pt. II), 89 TEx. L. REV. 367, 383 (2010)
("[T]he Court's reliance on Batson as a means of preventing racial discrimination in capital jury
selection is profoundly misplaced. Studies of the effectiveness of Batson in reducing the racebased used [sic] of peremptory strikes have demonstrated only an extremely modest effect.").
3. See sources cited supra note 2; see also EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL
1.

DISCRIMINATION INJURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 4 (201o), available at http://eji.

org/eji/files/EJI%2oRace%2oand%2oJury%2oReport.pdf ("Too many courtrooms across this
country facilitate obvious racial bigotry and discrimination every week when criminal trial juries
are selected. The underrepresentation and exclusion of people of color from juries has
seriously undermined the credibility and reliability of the criminal justice system .... ."); Jeffrey
Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net To Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically
Bigoted or Painfully UnimaginativeAttorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2Ol 1) ("[V]irtually
every commentator (and numerous judges) who have studied the issue have concluded that
race-based juror strikes continue to plague American trials."); Montoya, supra note 2, at toog
(analyzing survey results that show many practicing lawyers believe that Batson does not
effectively prevent unlawful discrimination); Sarma, supra note 2, at 70 ("Racially biased use of
peremptory strikes and illegal racial discrimination in jury selection remains widespread .... "
(quoting EQUALJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra, at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 70
("[C]ourts have shirked their duty to take seriously these recurring claims of racial
discrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael Janofsky, Under Siege,
Philadelphia's Criminal Justice System Suffers Another Blow, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/1 o/us/under-siege-philadelphia-s-criminal-justice-systemthe
repercussions from
(reporting
suffers-another-blow.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
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Although I can only accomplish this in very broad strokes in this
symposium context, I suggest two related points. First, in Part II, I posit that
"blame" might account for some degree of Batson's ineffectiveness. That is,
the failure of Batson to live up to its promise may, at least in part, stem from
the association of a Batson violation with personal fault or failing.4 Blame in
this context may be warranted or unwarranted, depending on the
circumstances, but even when justified, it is quite possibly counterproductive
to the ultimate goal of eliminating discrimination in the use of peremptory
strikes.5
In Part III, I make the second and related point that blame seems
inevitable under Batson. This is because Batson enforces the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee, and blame appears to follow inexorably from
both of the two dominant theories of equal protection analysis:
anticlassification and antisubordination. Indeed, this could be a problem for
equal protection law more generally, well beyond the issue of discriminatory
juror challenges. Assuming blame is unavoidable under current theory and
interferes with rooting out discrimination, this Essay briefly explores a
possible alternative view of equal protection-antibalkanization-that may
better resolve the problem of discriminatory peremptories without
necessarily raising the specter of blame. This Essay concludes by considering
the applicability of this alternative theory to the Sixth Amendment, instead
of the Equal Protection Clause, in the service of addressing discriminatory
peremptory strikes.
II. BATSO S ATrRIBUTION OF BLAME
In an earlier article, I argued that a court's finding of a Batson equal
protection violation amounts to an imputation of discriminating and lying
on the part of the striking attorney, potentially warranting professional

disclosure of a training video in which an assistant district attorney instructs inexperienced

colleagues how to exclude blacks from juries).
4.

Cf Adam M. Gershowitz, ProsecutorialShaming: Naming Attorneys To Reduce Prosecutorial

Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1059, 1o84-88 (2009) (discussing reasons judges are
reluctant to identify prosecutors, including some who committed Batson violations, by name
when their cases are being reversed for misconduct; most such reasons assume that naming is
shaming); Richard A. Posner, What DoJudges andJustices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 Sup. Cr. ECON. REV. 1, 13 (1993) ("Judges' desire to be popular with lawyers may

express itself in reluctance to impose sanctions upon or even to criticize lawyers who perform
below reasonable professional standards. ..").
5. Assignment of blame and fault may be problematic in a broad range of criminal law
contexts, in particular those involving prosecutors and police, since it leads to behaviors that
work against desired aims. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDoZO L.
REV. 2119, 2121, 2130-31 (2010) (questioning the utility of the rhetoric of fault because it
"invites prosecutors to resist and disengage from the study and prevention of wrongful [conduct

and] convictions").
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censure.6 The charge of discrimination is inherent in the ruling itself-the
ruling is an official finding that an attorney unconstitutionally struck a
potential juror because of his or her race or sex. Further, the accusation of
misrepresentation is also inherent in the ruling-the attorney is required to
provide a nondiscriminatory reason for his strike at the second step of the
Batson procedure, which the judge has necessarily rejected at the third step.
As Sheri Lynn Johnson later more colorfully described it, making a Batsonviolation ruling is equivalent to calling the striking attorney "a racist-and a
liar to boot."7 For this reason, I worried that this unfortunate but
unavoidable association of personal fault with Batson infringements could
result in judges' disinclination to rule that attorneys had indeed committed
Batson violations.8

It is now clear that judges have been hesitant to make rulings of Batson
breaches when the issue has been raised, although given the information
currently available, we do not know exactly why.9 There may be anecdotal

6. Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and DiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9
(1997).
7. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Recalcitrance: The Miller-El Remands, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 131, 158 (2007) (admonishing the Supreme Court to take into account the recalcitrance of
trial judges "to make a finding that someone with whom you must sit down at the next bar
luncheon is a racist-and a liar to boot," and suggesting that the Court therefore emphasize to
trial judges the importance of being vigilant against frequently unconscious racial
stereotyping).
8. Charlow, supra note 6, at 6o (arguing that, given the often-repeated personal
interactions among trial judges and attorneys who practice before them, "[i]f trial judges
understand that finding a Batson violation triggers an obligation to consider imposing personal
sanctions on such attorneys, they may be disinclined to find violations"); id. at 61 (explaining
that even if judges do not themselves impose personal sanctions on Batson violators, "the
awareness that personal sanctions may flow from a Batson ruling could be sufficient to cause a
judge to hesitate in finding a violation").
9. See Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: DisparateImpact and the (Mis)Use of Batson,
4 5 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359, 1388-96 (2012) (cataloging numerous examples of disparate racial
results in jury selection and speculating on many possible reasons for this phenomenon,
including unconscious racial bias and judges' solicitude for attorneys they know); see also Melilli,
supra note 2, at 461 (observing that courts accepted prosecutors' allegedly nondiscriminatory
explanations of challenges roughly eighty percent of the time); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's
Invidious Legacy: DiscriminatoryJurorExclusion and the "Intuitive"Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 336, 358 (1993) (reporting that appellate courts reversed convictions on Batson
grounds in only three out of seventy-six examined cases in which such challenges were raised).
Though these statistics clearly indicate that Batson-based challenges are usually rejected, it is not
possible to ascertain whether courts were warranted or not in declining to find more violations.
Moreover, despite the possibility of anemic enforcement of Batson reflected in these reported
studies, there are certainly variations in individual experiences. A colleague who recently served
as a public defender in a heavily minority district in New York City relates that in the Bronx
Criminal Court Batson-violation rulings were common and also that defense attorneys shrugged
them off without hurt feelings. Conversation with Jacob Stevens, Dir. of the Criminal Justice
Clinic, Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law, at the Hofstra Law Faculty Workshop, in Hempstead, N.Y.
(July 6, 2011). Even if findings of misconduct based on Batson were made more frequently, it
does not necessarily follow that the wayward attorneys would be personally chastised. Studies
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evidence that blame is one consideration,lo but without more data than is
presently available, it is impossible to ascertain just how great a role blame
actually plays in this calculus.
Nevertheless, it does not require hard data to surmise that, logically,
blame bears at least some of the load. No one wishes to accuse those with
whom they regularly associate, both professionally and often personally, of
moral wrongdoing.- Yet virtually every Batson ruling potentially carries such
a stigma.
Moreover, because Batson-violation rulings are effectively indictments of
personal morality, they are unlike most other routine trial rulings. Batson
violations necessarily involve findings of such socially unacceptable behavior
as intentional race or sex discrimination, as well as false representations of
the reasons for those unsociable acts. Other common trial rulings
concerning matters such as evidence, witness examination, and the like do
not regularly and similarly involve ethical judgments about the behavior of
the attorneys involved. But rulings that an attorney has purposefully
discriminated by race or sex and then lied about having done so seem
freighted with a dimension of personal moral delinquency that simply does
not characterize many other trial-related holdings. Thus, a judge finding a
Batson violation is doing something possibly quite different from a judge
making most other common legal rulings. Calling attorneys racists and liars
is just not the same as labeling them overstepping cross-examiners or
charging them with offering inadmissible evidence. In short, Batson findings
impute personal moral failing to the acting attorney in a way that most other
2
legal rulings usually do not.'

show that when judges find violations of professional standards by prosecutors, the prosecutors
are rarely punished for their misconduct. E.g., KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY,
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDuCr IN CALIFORNIA, 1997-2009, at
5 (online ed. 2010), http://www.veritasinitiative.org/downloads/ProsecutorialMisconductExec_
Sum.pdf (reporting on the "alarming" scope and persistence of unpunished prosecutorial
misconduct in California); see Gershowitz, supra note 4, at 1o62-63 & nn.7-12. A general
failure to sanction would likely include instances of Batson violations.
io. See, e.g., Charlow, supranote 6, at i i (explaining that a friend who is a judge expressed
concern that her Batson rulings created an uncomfortable situation owing to their inherent
imputation of blame).
11.
See Roberts, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing the difficulty for ajudge of telling "a 'fellow
member of the bar' that he or she has been using race unlawfully," especially "when judge and
attorney frequently share the same courtroom" (quoting Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race
Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619, 2657 (1998) (book review))); cf. Posner, supra note 4,
at 13 (suggesting that judges may be reluctant to impose sanctions on or even criticize lawyers
who practice before them, owing to a desire to be popular with members of the bar).
12. There are some other rulings that may similarly involve an ethical dimension, such as a
prosecutor's deliberate omission to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense, as required
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Interestingly, as in the case of discriminatory
peremptories, judges seem similarly reluctant to name and sanction errant attorneys for Brady
violations. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 4, at io8o ("[C]ourts named the prosecutor
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If a Batson finding is indeed a conclusion of moral fault, then perhaps
any associated blame is warranted and should not trouble us. To determine
whether Batson-violating strikes are truly blameworthy, it is necessary to
explore what specific kinds of acts might lead to findings of Batson violations.
There are several different types of potentially discriminatory peremptory
strikes, and some may be more righteously condemned than others.
Historically, when race relations in America were characterized by overt
racial prejudice, African Americans were considered intellectually and
otherwise unfit to participate as jurors and routinely struck from the pool of
potential candidates out of blatant bias.'s The era of overt bias could be
described as embodying a subordination model of interracial social
interaction, in which one race was considered superior and another inferior.
Clearly, strikes based on conclusions of racial inferiority are morally
inappropriate by today's reckoning. While such strikes may still sometimes
occur, over time, as overt bias and notions of subordination essentially
became socially unacceptable, we appear to have moved into a period in
which race relations might be characterized as more about unconscious bias
and unequal concern or regard than about overt prejudice.,4 As a result,
discriminatory peremptories are also more likely to take different forms.
Today, many arguably discriminatory peremptories result from a
deliberate choice to remove jurors of a particular race or group because of
stereotyped or "tribalist" (common group affinity) thinking about the
sympathies of different races or sexes, rather than from notions of inferiority

[responsible] in only thirty-five percent of the capital cases reversed for Brady violations from
1997 through 2007.").
13. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 393-94 (188o) ("'[T]hat none but white men were
selected is in nowise remarkable in view of the fact-too notorious to be ignored-that the
great body of black men residing in this State are utterly unqualified by want of intelligence,

experience, or moral integrity to sit on juries.' The exceptions ... were rare." (quoting the
lower court's decision)).
14.

See ELLIS COSE, THE END OF ANGER: A NEW GENERATION'S TAKE ON RACE AND RAGE 28

(2o11)

("We are witnessing ... a fundamental shift in the nature of the black-white

relationship in America ....

As white racism has become unacceptable, unremitting black

anger has become inappropriate .... ); id. at 131-32 (quoting a young black MBA employed by
a strategic consulting firm who relates that while overtly racist or sexist comments in her

workplace are "almost unimaginable," people still act with possibly unconscious racial thoughts
and perceptions "in the background");Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, s18 HARV. L. REV 1489,
1514 (2005) ("There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social category...
predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that category. This occurs
notwithstanding contrary explicit commitments in favor of racial equality."); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.

REV. 317, 335 (1987) ("Increasingly, as our culture has rejected racism as immoral and
unproductive, [unconscious] hidden prejudice has become the more prevalent form of
racism."); Antony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge,

85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 191

(2005) ("Today, few Americans are prepared to publicly state that they
have racist, or to a lesser degree, sexist beliefs, since holding those beliefs is generally no longer
socially acceptable.").
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or subordination.5 Attorneys are concerned about jurors sympathizing with
the opposing side. They have a duty to work as ardent advocates for their
clients. Particularly in the federal system, where voir dire is often quite
limited (though in state courts as well), they do not have much information
about any individual potential juror, except for such obvious physical
characteristics as race and a few revealed facts (typically name, address, and
occupation).' 6 Attorneys assume that sympathies correlate with such factors
as race or sex (stereotyping), or with racial, ethnic, or gender commonality
with their client (tribalism), and they exercise peremptories accordingly.'7
These assumptions and stereotypes concerning sympathy may even be
accurate. Research indicates that group stereotypes and preferences form as
a result of the routine psychological process of categorization.'8 When we
first meet people or encounter objects, we automatically begin to categorize
them in order to bring order to our complex world and to simplify and
make sense of it.'9 Fairly obvious characteristics such as race and sex are

15. Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned Shaw-Requiring the Government to Treat Citizens As
Individuals When It Cannot, 49 LOy. L. REV. 133, 139-40 (2003) (explaining that the dissenters
in Batson and its progeny correctly observed that "[l]awyers ... exercise peremptories based
upon their guesses about the loyalty and potential partiality of jurors," rather than, as the
majority seemed to reason, on determinations of an individual juror's competence or potential
bias); see also Page, supra note 14, at 181 (describing the results of cognitive research suggesting
that the "ordinary, routine and completely normal" psychological process of categorization,
which we all employ in order to understand our world, "can, of its own accord, lead to
stereotyping and discrimination").
16. Tetlow, supra note 15, at 133 ("[A] prosecutor facing a jury pool must exercise a
peremptory challenge based on little more than the juror's occupation, appearance, and
neighborhood.").
17. See, e.g.,
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex Tel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1994) (explaining that
the respondent's attorney in a paternity case asserted that his decision to strike "virtually all the
males from the jury ... 'may reasonably have been based upon the perception, supported by
history, that men ...might be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of a man
alleged ... to be the father of an out-of-wedlock child, while women ... might be more
sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of the complaining witness who bore the child"'
(quoting Brief for Respondent at io, id. (No. 92-1239))); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
424 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the categorical exclusion of a group from jury
service, which implies that all its members are incompetent or untrustworthy, a peremptory
strike on the basis of group membership implies nothing more than the undeniable reality
(upon which the peremptory strike system is largely based) that all groups tend to have
particular sympathies and hostilities-most notably, sympathies towards their own group
members.").
18. See Page, supra note 14, at 187 (reviewing psychological research literature establishing
that stereotyping, or "social categorization," is merely a subset of the routine mental process of
categorization); id. ("Stereotyping, like categorizing, consists of inferring a relatively complete
idea about a specific subject based on a small amount of information.").
19.
Lawrence, supra note 14, at 337 ("All humans tend to categorize in order to make
sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully with each one on an
individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope."); Page, supra note 14, at 186 (noting that
categorization, "probably 'the most basic and essential of all cognitive processes,' ... serves to
simplify the world, [allowing us to avoid being] engulfed in a tidal wave of details" (quoting
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readily perceived in other people and often used to categorize.20 We engage
in stereotyping, a subset of categorizing, by generalizing from characteristics
associated with those in each social category. We also find ourselves more or
less comfortable with, or sympathetic to, people in a category simply because
it is familiar to us. Usually, this is based on whether we ourselves belong to
the same or a different category (a kind of tribalism).2' Thus, whether

innate, learned, or both, the "natural" process of categorization inevitably
results in both stereotyping and tribalism. 2
This process renders the connection between stereotyping and
tribalism, on the one hand, and assumed group-member sympathy, on the
other hand, often accurate. That is, as a result of the psychological process
that produces stereotypes, we in fact often sympathize based on group
stereotypes and common group identity.23 As a consequence, if we are to
obtain juries not predisposed against, or at least not less sympathetic to,
particular parties, we should perhaps allow strikes based on stereotyping.24
At a minimum, this psychological evidence probably suggests that a properly
2

Michael A. Hogg, Social Categorization, Depersonalization, and Group Behavior, in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOG: GROUP PROCESSES 56, 58 (Michael A. Hogg & Scott Tindale

eds.,

201 1))).

Page, supra note 14, at 187 ("[P]eople categorize other people by race, sex, ethnicity
and the like in the same way that they categorize furniture as chairs, tables, couches and the
like." (quoting Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253, 253 (James S. Uleman & John A.
Bargh eds., 1989))).
21.
Id. at 187-88 (observing that a "stereotype can be understood as a cognitive structure
that contains sweeping concepts of the behaviors, traits and attitudes associated with the
members of a social category," and that by oversimplifying, stereotyping inevitably leads to
bias). Studies show that even in artificially formed groups, "[p]eople experience more positive
feelings towards those individuals in the same group as they are," id. at 195, while they "see
those in other groups as a more homogeneous mass ... and in a more negative manner." Id. at
196 (footnote omitted).
22.
Id. at 181 (stating that since the late 197os, psychologists have been "explor[ing] the
notion that discrimination ... may [result from] ordinary, routine and completely normal
cognitive mental processes"); id. at 187 ("Normal, routine and unconscious cognitive processes
lead to the formation of categories.... Stereotyping is ... a subset of [such] categorization
....
(footnote omitted)).
23.
See Hilarie Bass, Are We Really Color-blind After All?, LITIGATION, Winter 2011, at i, 1
(commenting on the "immense" implications for the justice system of studies indicating that
"we are all affected by unconscious biases [as the] result of an innate human tendency to feel
more comfortable with one's own kind that is reinforced by repeated exposure to societal
stereotypes by families, the media, advertising, social interactions, and all other forms of sensory
input").
24. Tetlow, supra note 15, at 143 ("Criminal defendants, in particular, should retain
permission to stereotype by race about the probability of a potential juror's racist beliefs or
racial allegiances. Application of the Batson rule disables this mechanism of obtaining a fair
jury. 'Unless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire,' the defendant will be without
authority to strike them." (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61-62 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring))).
20.
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ardent advocate's correct choice in some circumstances might be to follow
the dictates of an assumed race-connected or gender-connected sympathy.25
Another possible type of discriminatory peremptory challenge might be
one that results from what has been called "unconscious racism."26 1 hesitate

to use this term because it carries a pejorative connotation, and my larger
point is that we might want to reconsider our fixation with fault-based
constructs. I will use it here as a shorthand to mean that the striking attorney
is unaware that his or her strike was based on race, though a court could
nevertheless rule, quite possibly correctly, that in fact it was. The attorney
believes he or she was motivated to strike by some other factor, but a judge
weighing the available evidence concludes that the challenge was really
based on race. For example, this might occur where the attorney is
motivated by racial stereotyping or tribalism of which he or she is unaware.
There is a natural human tendency to view our own behavior as particularly
moral, so that the idea that one is acting in a racist manner is difficult to
swallow; we (in this case, the striking attorney) thus deceive ourselves into
2
believing that we are not.

7

Finally, some potentially discriminatory peremptories may result from
unequal regard or concern, or what one might call differing sensitivity.25 In
this circumstance, the striking attorney does not consider with equal
concern how his or her strike will differentially impact members of different
racial or other groups. For example, in a securities-fraud case involving a
wealthy defendant, defense counsel might strike all potential jurors who live
in poor areas of the city on the assumption that they will not be able to
understand the nuances of the issues or relate well to the person or world
view of the wealthy defendant. This could incidentally result in the complete
or near complete exclusion of African Americans or Latinos, an unintended
but, to the striking attorney, not particularly concerning side effect. The

25.
Id. at 136 ("It ignores human experience to pretend that race is not a potentially
valuable predictor of certain beliefs, which are, after all, often the result of common

experience.").
26. In his

1987 article The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, Charles Lawrence argued that we are all pervasively influenced by "a common ...
cultural heritage" and system of beliefs concerning race, both of which reflect "negative feelings
and opinions about nonwhites." Lawrence, supra note 14, at 322. As a result, according to
Lawrence, "we are all racists," yet "most of us are unaware of our racism," hence the term
"unconscious racism." Id. at 322-23.
27. "Studies demonstrate that people tend to overestimate their ability to act ethically,
both prospectively ... and in hindsight when asked to evaluate how ethical they have been in
the past." Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L.
REv. 43, 71 (2009); id. at 71 nn. 138-42 (citing and describing a variety of articles reporting on
psychological research dealing with this phenomenon).

28. Charles Lawrence, borrowing from Paul Brest, refers to a kind of "selective sympathy
or indifference" that seems very close to the same notion. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 348 &
n. 135 (quoting Paul Brest, Foreword, In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 349, 357 n. 18,.
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same attorney might have acted with less indifference had members of his or
her own group been adversely affected, but might treat the racially
unbalanced effect of the strikes with less regard when a different racial
group is the one excluded. Technically, under current law, this would not be
a Batson violation because the strikes were not based intentionally on race or
sex, but rather on a different factor.29 However, some would still view the
grossly disproportionate or complete exclusion of racial or ethnic minorities
as a problematic outcome and consider this an instance of discriminatory
peremptories.30
Many of the above examples of conscious and unconscious stereotyping
and tribalism, as well as unequal regard, are likely tied to the previously
described psychological process of "categorization." We tend to pigeonhole
people into racial categories and then make assumptions about them that
correlate with those categories, both consciously and unconsciously. We also
afford different levels of regard to categories, depending on whether we
ourselves belong and how well we can relate to a given category.
Which, if any, of these different types of discriminatory peremptory
challenges are deserving of blame?3, Historical overt racial discrimination is
clearly culpable because it is based on the morally discredited notion of
racial inferiority and subordination, but it is also largely no longer the issue.
The blameworthiness of conscious or unconscious stereotyping or
tribalism is more difficult to determine. If stereotyping makes sense in terms
of securing a fair trial for one's client-for example, for a criminal
defendant-then perhaps it should not be ethically condemnedy2 Also, if
stereotyping and tribalism are the consequence of an automatic
psychological categorization process, then perhaps we should not blame
attorneys for acting according to such a normal, routine process of

29.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)

peremptory challenges

(upholding the use of

against some Spanish-speaking potential jurors based on the

prosecutor's suspicion that they might not readily accept the official translation of key Spanishlanguage testimony, despite the obviously disproportionate effect on Latinos).
30.
See, e.g., Quin M. Sorenson, Comment, Backdooring Batson: The Improper Use of Racial
Memory and Other "Peculiar"CharacteristicsinJuror Challenges, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 71, 87
(2003) (criticizing Hernandez on the ground that, "[e]ven if the challenging attorney is not
consciously acting in a discriminatory manner, the Equal Protection rights of the excluded

jurors are violated if the attorney's use of peremptory challenges is based on a characteristic
exclusive to one race"); cf Johnson, supra note 7, at 158 (suggesting that proffered race-neutral
reasons for strikes that amount to "recitation of stereotypes about African Americans," such as
having relatives who have been criminally prosecuted, "should be viewed with greater suspicion
than citation of non-stereotyped characteristics or responses" because in such circumstances
"skepticism is warranted").

31.

Some would argue that all are both unconstitutional and morally wrong. See

discussion, supra note 26 (discussing Charles Lawrence's opinion).
32.
See, e.g., Tetlow, supra note 15, at 141 ("In the jury selection process, stereotyping
decisions serve an important instrumental goal; peremptory challenges balance the makeup of
thejury in the interest of a fair trial.").
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information sorting, whether conscious or unconscious. Not everyone in the
legal or psychological communities would agree with this last point.33

However, to the extent that is because they believe categorization is
sometimes so undesirable that we ought to try to train ourselves to avoid it,
this would still not mean that following such impulses, especially when doing
so unconsciously, is necessarily immoral or faultworthy.
The blameworthiness of unequal regard or sensitivity is also
problematic. Since this type of discrimination is "in spite of," not "because
of," race or sex, the Supreme Court has indicated that it would not amount
to purposeful discrimination, which is required for an equal protection
violation under Batson.34 This does not mean that such discrimination
should be ignored in a broader quest for social justice and inclusion, but it
might mean that it is less obviously unethical than intentional
discrimination. In other words, in the case of unequal regard, one has acted
out of an often unconscious absence of commensurate concern, which
seems perhaps less morally delinquent than having acted with an affirmative
discriminatory purpose. Moreover, if we focus on the previously discussed
evidence of the natural process of categorization, which could well have led
to the inequality in concern, the moral ambiguity of such strikes is only
heightened.
Despite having digressed to consider blameworthiness, it is important to
remember that, regardless of whether or not blame is deserved, a fault-based
overlay is probably counterproductive to eliminating discriminatory strikes.35
People do not generally react well to being accused of bad behavior, or

33. See Page, supra note 14, at 187 (explaining that categorizing and stereotyping are the
results of "[n]ormal, routine and unconscious cognitive processes"). But see Susan T. Fiske,
Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in
UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989) (arguing that the
ease of categorization and concomitant stereotyping should not be taken to imply a lack of
intent or responsibility for resulting discrimination).
34. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986) (establishing that in the third step of
the peremptory-challenge analysis, the court determines whether the accused attorney engaged
in "purposeful discrimination," meaning he or she intentionally struck ajuror based on race);
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("[Discriminatory purpose] implies that
the decisionmaker ...selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.").
35.
Contra Charles Lawrence III,
Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and
Origins of "The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection," 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 946 (2008) (explaining
the author's reasoning, in his seminal work on racism, that calling his white liberal friends
"racist" was necessary in order to indicate that no one is absolved from responsibility for our
collective participation in "America's racism"). Lawrence was concerned that avoiding the racist
label meant giving a "pass" on responsibility for remedying the problems that stem from
pervasive negative racial attitudes, a responsibility that we all bear. Id. However, avoiding
personally derogatory labels may be more conducive to enlisting individuals in taking
ownership of the problem and engaging in remedial efforts.
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worse, morally bereft character.36 We like to think of ourselves as ethical and
view our own conduct through that lens.37 Being labeled unethical or

immoral is not only psychologically distressing, but may also have practical
repercussions.38 In this particular context, if we want attorneys to cooperate
and alter their thinking or behavior to avoid racially and sexually
discriminatory strikes, criticizing them with fault-based rhetoric and
attaching inflammatory labels like "racist" and "liar" to them may not be the
best way to go about it. Blaming could lead instead to pushback and
intransigence.39 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, blaming may also be too
extreme for judges, who often deal with attorneys they know personally,
resulting in their disinclination to find Batson violations at all.4o If we are not
prepared either to eliminate peremptories altogether-which is still an
option-or to live with the current state of ineffectual policing of them, we
may need to get beyond blame.
III. EQUAL

PROTECTION THEORY AND BLAME

Is it possible to rule that someone has violated the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee without implicating personal blame? This depends on
what we understand to be an equal protection violation.
There are two dominant and competing theories for determining
whether equal protection has been offended. The "anticlassification" view of
equal protection has evolved as the approach adopted by the Court's
majority.4, Anticlassification theory is concerned with the treatment of

36. SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VicTiMs, PERPETRATORS, AND
RESPONSIBILITY I1 (1996) ("The more you blame a person, the more ashamed he feels and the
greater his tendency will be to hide his head, deny his wrongdoing, or look outward for
causality. There does not seem to be any easy way to both blame and encourage another to take
responsibility for his actions.").
37. Eldred, supra note 27, at 68 ("[W]hen one engages in questionable ethical behavior,
one's automatic process of self-defense, born out of the motivation to see one's self as moral,
justifies the behavior as being consistent with ethical norms.").
38. For example, there is a demonstrated association between bad moral character and
inculpation. One study indicates a tendency to inculpate persons of bad character while
absolving those of good character who committed the exact same act. Janice Nadler & MaryHunter McDonnell, Moral Character,Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255,
273-91 (2012).

39.

See supra note 5.
See supra notes 4 and 8.
41. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004) [hereinafter Siegel,
Equality Talk] ("Scholars debate what our constitutional understanding of equality ought to be,
but most would agree that American equal protection law has expressed anticlassification,
rather than antisubordination, commitments as it has developed over the past half-century.");
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287 (201 1) [hereinafter Siegel, Colorblindness] ("On the
conventional account, the anticlassification understanding of equal protection ultimately
prevailed ... ").
40.
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individuals; under an anticlassification regime, it is a presumptive violation
of the Equal Protection Clause for the government to classify any person by
race.42 The intent to discriminate by classifying in this way is required for a
violation.43
Often contrasted with the anticlassification approach is the
"antisubordination" understanding of equal protection. Antisubordination
theory initially arose as a means of determining the proper outcome in
affirmative-action disputes and appears to be the favored understanding of
equal protection in the legal academy.44 Under this principle, constitutional

equal protection is concerned with inequalities in group status; it is an
antisubordination Equal Protection Clause violation for the government to
treat a group (such as a racial group) or its members as subordinate,
inferior, or less worthy because of their group status or common group
characteristic.45
In addition to these two theories, Reva Siegel recently suggested that, in
the specific context of affirmative-action cases, the Court's "race moderates"
(those who sometimes vote to uphold and sometimes to strike affirmativeaction measures, such asJustice Kennedy and formerJustice O'Connor) are
really following a third model, an "antibalkanization" approach.46 Under an

Siegel, Colorblindness, supra note 41, at 1287 (noting that the anticlassification theory
42.
views the "paradigmatic harm not as group subordination but rather the classification of any
individual by race").
43. Id. at 1291 (citing 1970s Supreme Court decisions ruling that facially neutral practices
with a disparate impact do not amount to an equal protection violation unless they were
adopted with a discriminatory purpose); see also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. i, Denver, Colo.,
413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
44. Siegel, Colorblindness, supra note 41, at 1281 ("The Justices who vote to uphold
affirmative action policies as constitutional are said to reason from an antisubordination
principle that identifies racial stratification (rather than classification) as the wrong .... ."); id.
at 1288 n.23 (listing authorities, mostly academics, who "have urged that equal protection is
best understood as concerned with group subordination"). One could maintain that those who
call for equal protection enforcement based solely on the disparate impact of government
action are espousing a third, competing understanding of the constitutional guarantee. For a
variety of reasons too complex to outline in this limited context-but mostly because it is
considered an especially broad principle that could result in a cascade of litigation-I am not
considering disparate impact a viable competitor to the two theories discussed in the text. Cf
Lawrence, supra note 14, at 345 n.115 (ascribing to Owen Fiss a variant of disparate-impact
analysis as the essence of equal protection injury); id. at 354 (referring to the "parade of
horribles" that some believe a disparate-impact rule could engender); id. at 364-65, 365
nn.225-28 (examining issues that could illustrate why disparate impact might not be a realistic
contender for a constitutional equal protection rule).
45. Siegel, Colorblindness,supra note 41, at 1288-89 ("[T]he antisubordination principle is
concerned with protecting members of historically disadvantaged groups from the harms of
unjust social stratification."); accord Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 41, at 1472-73.
46. Siegel, Colorblindness, supra note 41, at 128 1-82 (describing as "race moderates" the
Justices "in the middle of Supreme Court conflicts over race equality.., who allow and limit
civil ights initiatives in order to preserve social cohesion" and deeming their approach to equal
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antibalkanization principle, equal protection is ultimately concerned with
threats to social cohesion.47 The affirmative-action rule that Siegel derives
from these Justices' presumed antibalkanization focus is that race-conscious
but facially neutral government policies promoting the socially desirable
goal of equal opportunity are constitutional as long as they "do not make
race so salient as to affront dignity and threaten divisiveness."4 8
While the antibalkanization principle may not currently be applicable
outside the limited affirmative-action situation in which Siegel observed it, it
may relate to my point concerning Batson and blame. As I intend to show
shortly, the prevailing equal protection anticlassification theory essentially
requires imputation of blame. Though many have urged substitution of the
alternative antisubordination theory, that theory also invokes blame. The
antibalkanization principle, however, might provide a way out of this
dilemma. It could allow for finding an equal protection violation without
necessarily implicating personal fault. To determine whether this is so, we
need to examine the role of blame in each theory.
Under an anticlassification approach, using race to classify individuals is
in itself discriminatory and therefore bad.49 One must do so purposefully for
there to be a violation.5o Consequently, a court's finding of an equal
protection violation under this theory-the theory endorsed by the Courttranslates into a finding of conscious, purposeful, deliberate, and
discriminatory action, something usually considered morally as well as legally
wrong. Because the bad behavior is intentional, the actor is necessarily
personally at fault. Thus, it would seem that an anticlassification-violation
ruling, by its very nature, unavoidably entails blame.
When it comes to antisubordination, one must surmise how it would
pertain if employed here, since it has never commanded a majority of the
Court and therefore has not actually been used to test the constitutionality
of peremptories. If the Court applied an antisubordination rule to
peremptories, it would probably be a violation of equal protection to strike a
protection the "'antibalkanization' perspective" (footnote omitted)). For a fuller development
of this theme, see id. at 1293-1303.

47.

Id. at 1281.

48. Id. at 1356-57.
49. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (adopting and applying the
presumption that overt governmental racial classifications are in themselves unconstitutional);
see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[G]overnment must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or
religious groups. It is for this reason that we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest
of scrutiny .... "); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("Certain
classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm.
A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be
upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.").
50.
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (holding that classification with a disparate impact "is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose").
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potential juror only if the attorney did so in order to subordinate members
of a particular race or sex, or to treat those groups as inferior. Following
such a rule, many racially based peremptories might not qualify as equal
protection violations.
For example, suppose the attorney for a black defendant deliberately
strikes whites. There is not usually any particular reason to think such strikes
stem from a notion of the racial inferiority of whites. The attorney is not
likely to be treating whites in a subordinating manner. Therefore, under
antisubordination theory, this would not amount to an equal protection
violation.
On the other hand, suppose a white prosecutor strikes blacks. Somenotably Charles Lawrence-might say this is an instance of subordination.
Lawrence's equal protection theory focuses on the commonly understood
social or cultural meaning of such an act.5, He might conclude this is an
antisubordination violation because a significant portion of the population
would generally view this as a situation in which the power and legal
apparatus of the state is used, as it historically had been used, to eliminate
blacks from juries and from participation as full citizens.52 But many
peremptory strikes are based instead on stereotyped assumptions about the
sympathies of members of different groups, including racial groups.
Therefore, what if this white prosecutor maintains that he usually or even
always strikes those of the same race as the defendant, whatever race that
may be in each case, based on an (often accurate) assumption about
presumed sympathy?53 Viewed from this perspective, a white prosecutor's

51.

Lawrence, supra note 14, at 350-55.

Id. at 350-51 ("The social meaning of racial segregation in the United States is the
designation of a superior and an inferior caste, and segregation proceeds 'on the ground that
colored citizens are ... inferior and degraded."' (alteration in original) (quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 56o (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); id. at 355-56 (presenting the
"cultural meaning" test for measuring unconscious but unconstitutional discrimination, in
which courts "would evaluate governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to
which the culture attaches racial significance"). Lawrence argued that if, considering the social
and historical context in which a governmental decision was made, "a significant portion of the
population thinks of the governmental action in racial terms," there would be a presumption
that the decisionmakers were influenced by this meaning and heightened scrutiny would apply.
Id. at 356. For applications of his cultural meaning test, see id. at 362-65 (demonstrating
application of the test to easy cases), id. at 365-78 (applying the test to harder cases), and id. at
378-81 (explaining additional difficulties with using the test).
53. For a discussion of the accuracy of presumed sympathies, see supra note 17. See also
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138-39 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The use of group
52.

affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a 'proxy' for potential juror partiality, based on
the assumption or belief that members of one group are more likely to favor defendants who
belong to the same group ...may be extremely useful in eliminating from the jury persons who
might be biased in one way or another." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); Bellin &
Semitsu, supra note 3, at io81 ("[R]ace-based peremptory strikes might constitute a rational
form of discrimination."); id. at 1o83 (" [W]e cannot realistically expect the salience of racebased jury selection to recede until the societal relevance of race diminishes."); cf Andrew E.
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strikes of blacks in a case with a black defendant might not seem to be
instances of subordination, or at least not necessarily so. The prosecutor
does not care what particular race the defendant or the prospective juror is,
as long as they are the same race, and is not acting from any belief about the
inferiority or superiority of particular individual races.
Since all of the peremptory challenges just mentioned might not
present equal protection violations under an antisubordination theory, if
antisubordination were the governing equal protection rule, the overall
outcome might be fewer Batson violations than under the prevailing
anticlassification regime. However, when they do occur, subordinating
peremptories would likely occasion well-deserved derision and blame. It is
clearly considered immoral to treat some racial groups as less worthy than
others. In fact, it is probably even more blameworthy to commit an
antisubordination violation than an anticlassification violation because it
appears morally more reprehensible to treat someone worse based on a
hierarchy of classes than to treat them simply worse. Therefore, the possible
result using antisubordination theory might be fewer Batson violations but
with more blame attached to each infraction.
The first part of my thesis is that blame is the enemy here, and I have
now concluded that applications of both anticlassification and
antisubordination theories appear to entail blame. This leaves one to
wonder whether there is any way out of this box. Is there an alternative
theory of equal protection that presents less of a problem of blame? We
should consider how Siegel's antibalkanization understanding of certain
affirmative-action rulings might apply to equal protection in this very
different context. Although the antibalkanization principle Siegel derives
does not actually relate to allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges,
perhaps its central theme-a concern with social cohesion-could be
usefully extrapolated to the peremptory context. Indeed, there is some
warrant for extrapolation, as there are already hints of antibalkanization
language in a few Court opinions dealing with instances of alleged racial
discrimination in non-affirmative action situations, including in some
peremptories cases.54

Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the

Individualized SuspicionJudgment Right, 8 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 7 (2010) (discussing generally how
inaccurate first impressions due to lack of familiarity with other racial groups, coupled with
undeserved confidence in one's ability to judge others, operate as cognitive obstacles to police
correctly assessing individualized suspicion).
54. See, e.g.,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex relT.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994) (decrying instances
when a juror is "excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions
that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination [because such a strike]
denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclusion
from political participation[, sending the message] that certain individuals ... are presumed
unqualified by state actors to decide important questions" (footnotes omitted) (citation
omitted)); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 50o U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) ("If our society is
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Using the antibalkanization principle, a possible extrapolation to
peremptories might be a rule that says: a race-conscious peremptory strike is
constitutional as long as it addresses a legitimate social concern-for
example, fair-trial considerations, especially for a criminal defendant-but
even then it will violate equal protection if it affronts dignity or threatens
social divisiveness on racial grounds.55
Consider what results would ensue if this rule were applied in some of
the situations previously discussed. First, all racially subordinating
peremptories would be unconstitutional, as they affront the dignity of the
stricken jurors and are inherently divisive. Likewise, strikes of potential black
jurors by a prosecutor in a case with a black defendant would be
unconstitutional. As under antisubordination, these strikes may affront
dignity and therefore threaten social cohesion, given a Lawrence-type
argument regarding the cultural meaning of acts such as these. But unlike
the antisubordination rule, an antibalkanization standard could identify an
affront and a concomitant threat to social cohesion even if the prosecutor
were also to strike others of common race to the defendant in every case,
whatever the defendant's race. This is because the tribalist assumptions that
underlie such strikes may often be socially divisive, even if and when
accurate and non-subordinating. Next, suppose a black defendant strikes

to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic
invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury.");
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) ("[R]acial discrimination in the ... selection of
jurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts."); Brown v. North Carolina,
479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986) (O'ConnorJ., concurring in the denial of certiorari) ("That the
Court will not tolerate prosecutors' racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, in
effect, is a special rule of relevance, a statement about what this Nation stands for .... [T]hat
special rule is a product of the unique history of racial discrimination in this country .... ");
Tetlow, supra note 15, at 143 (citing Justice O'Connor's position, articulated in Brown and
JE.B., that Batson is not based on the counterfactual myth that race does not predict belief, but
rather reflects the unique role that racial dignity and harmony play in our multicultural
society); id. at 144 (noting that Batson pioneered a new standing doctrine by recognizing the
dignitary harm caused by the fact of race consciousness itself); id. at 146 (noting discussions of
dignitary harm resulting from discriminatory peremptories in JE.B. and Powers: "[r]acial use of
peremptory challenges 'denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror,"' (quotingJE.B., 511 U.S.
at 142)); id. (noting that racial use of peremptory challenges "causes 'profound personal
humiliation heightened by its public character'" (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14)); id. at
154 (citing Justice O'Connor's observation in Bush v. Vera, a race-based districting case, that
stereotyped thinking about racial preferences used by states in drawing voting districts would
appear to endorse."the disease" of "racial polarization in politics" (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 993 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In a
way, Charles Lawrence's cultural meaning analysis is also a kind of antibalkanization rule. His
analysis suggests that when the cultural meaning of a government action, in light of our racial
history, is that the action is a race-based dignitary affront, it will be socially divisive and should
be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection guarantee. See generally
Lawrence, supra note 14.
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the actual antibalkanization
rule).
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whites. Such a strike may threaten social cohesion as well because it
essentially says whites cannot be trusted to judge those of other races
impartially. Even if this is true, it is still divisive. Finally, consider the defense
attorney who strikes all those from poorer neighborhoods while defending
his wealthy client on charges of securities fraud. This, too, is arguably divisive
because, regardless of intent, the severe disparate impact on racial and
ethnic minorities (such as blacks or Latinos) is likely to be received as a
dignitary affront and racially polarizing.56
If one accepts the posited outcome in these examples, the overall result
of an antibalkanization theme would probably be many potential violations.
But maybe that is a desirable outcome. For many, the promise initially held
out by Batson was that race would cease to be a factor injury selection, where
now perhaps it very often is.
Assuming that courts found these examples were equal protection
violations on antibalkanization grounds, would they implicate blame? The
antibalkanization principle posits that race-conscious action is constitutional
if it promotes equal opportunity in a way that does not affront dignity and
undermine social cohesion. At least on its face, this rule does not appear to
lead to blame. This is because it focuses on the effect of government action,
not on the motivation or mindset of the actor.57 It asks whether the result of
the government's action is acceptable or not, using the matrix of social
cohesion. At the same time, it does not ask what the actor's motivation was
for his or her action. For both these reasons, antibalkanization appears to
avoid the black hole of blame.
Consider how an antibalkanization rule would operate in the context of
peremptory strikes. In that setting as well, a finding of an antibalkanization
violation would not likely invite blame. First, it is not a finding that the
striker acted out of immoral motives, such as the intent to discriminate
against members of one particular racial group, nor is it an indictment of
the attorney for his or her conviction that certain racial groups are inferior
and others superior. Rather, it is utilitarian. It focuses on the effect of the
strike on the stricken juror (does it affront the juror's dignity) and,

56. At this point, the antibalkanization rule might seem like a simple disparate-impact rule
of equal protection violation. However, the two are not identical. An antibalkanization rule
would not be as broad as a disparate-impact rule. Not every statistically differential racial result
would be a presumptive violation requiring strict scrutiny analysis. Only those disparate-impact
situations in which social balkanization was likely would amount to violations. Since such a
standard would not result in quite as many presumptive violations as a bare disparate-impact
rule, it might be more broadly acceptable as a constitutional standard than disparate impact has
proved to be.
57. By focusing on effect rather than intent, antibalkanization might be considered a
subset of disparate-impact analysis, which likewise concentrates on effect rather than intent.

However, because antibalkanization is defined and therefore circumscribed by certain limiting
principles, it could be a more realistic option than disparate impact, which is often considered
too broad a rule for adoption as the governing equal protection standard.
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ultimately, on society more generally (is it divisive), rather than
concentrating on the motivation or mental state of the striker. Hence, it is
not particularly concerned with personal moral fault and thus seems
unconnected to blame.
A ruling that a peremptory strike violates the antibalkanization
principle would not label the striker a racist and a liar. To be sure, it could
indicate that an attorney's strike affronts someone's dignity, and this might
seem accusatory as well. However, any such affront could be attributable to
the oversensitivity of the person stricken just as well as to the insensitivity of
the striker. A court could find an antibalkanization violation without ever
determining which of these was the case. This is because, unlike a ruling that
a strike violates either anticlassification or antisubordination, an
antibalkanization-violation ruling does not necessarily speak to the actor's
discriminatory intent in producing the undesirable effect. It is instead
concerned only with the socially undesirable effect of the action on the
victim and society, rather than with the morality of the actor or his act.
The antibalkanization principle potentially casts a much wider net than
intentional racial classification or subordination. It could encompass
violations under both of those theories because classifying and
subordinating based on race are often (perhaps even usually) socially
divisive as well. In addition, as can be seen in some of the examples
discussed above, antibalkanization might also find violations in cases
involving only the appearance of impropriety or racist action because even
such appearances can be divisive regardless of intent. Indeed, it would cover
all actions that are socially problematic on racial grounds, regardless of any
of these factors. As noted earlier, this could potentially cover a wide array of
actions..5 Thus, a possible result of imposing an antibalkanization rule in
this context might be the reverse of that from an antisubordination
perspective: there could be many equal protection violations, but with little
personal blame.
Though the antibalkanization principle might obviate the blame issue
with regard to unconstitutional peremptories, there are many obstacles to
advocating its use in this domain. Most glaring, perhaps, are questions of
legitimacy and feasibility. Antibalkanization may not be the proper
understanding of the equal protection guarantee. Constitutional originalists,
for example, will wonder whether it comports with the original
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. The fact that the theory may

58. Even though potentially broader than anticlassification and antisubordination, an
antibalkanization approach is still a confined subset of disparate-impact analysis, with more
limited application. It is, therefore, potentially less problematic than disparate-impact analysis.
Moreover, if Siegel is correct, it is already determining the outcome in a number of affirmativeaction decisions. Thus, antibalkanization seems to have greater potential to be accepted as a
viable theory of equal protection than disparate-impact analysis, which has already been
rejected by the Court as the touchstone of constitutional equal protection.
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prove useful in the limited context of peremptories could not possibly
suffice to establish it as the "correct" interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Furthermore, even if lawyers and scholars could argue it is the
proper, authoritative understanding of equal protection, it might not prove
as efficacious an interpretation in the many other contexts in which
problems of inequality arise. Issues such as these are too far reaching to
consider here.
However, there is a possible alternative avenue for relying on an
antibalkanization principle in the case of discriminatory peremptories, one
that is not dependent on an equal protection theory. Courts could find
discriminatory peremptories unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment's
"fair cross-section" jury requirement instead.59 The Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury could mean, in a variation on Tania Tetlow's
formulation, that "prospective jurors shall be selected... without
systematic... exclusion of [racial and other] groups."o Accepting this view
would require distinguishing (if possible) or overruling Holland v. Illinois,
which held that the fair cross-section requirement only applies to the venire,
not to the petit jury. 6' One potential basis for distinction is that applying
Tetlow's suggested rule "would not guarantee the racial makeup of the jury,"
as the Court in Holland feared would result if the Sixth Amendment covered
petit juries. 62 Rather, Tetlow's suggestion would "restrict the racial use of
peremptory challenges by both sides in order to protect the fair cross-section
of the jury from the disproportionate striking of one race." 63
The desirability and feasibility of Tetlow's proposal is too broad to cover
here. However, for purposes of this discussion, from an antibalkanization
perspective, suffice it to note that ajury constituted under this modification
of Tetlow's suggested rule could be the very antithesis of divisive. By
avoiding the requirement of any particular racial makeup, Tetlow forestalls
many potential divisiveness objections based on racial preference. She uses
the original randomly selected jury panel as the baseline and then
condemns only the subsequent distortion of this group owing to the
differential exclusion of one race. In the view of some, that was Batson's
original promise, if not its actual command. Tetlow thus concentrates on
and condemns a practice of racial distortion of juries that seems intuitively
inappropriate, just as it may have seemed to the Court in Batson. From an

59. See Tetlow, supra note 15, at 162-66.
6o. Id. at 163 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This formulation omits the word "intentional" where Tetlow used it, to modify
"exclusion." My suggestion is that the Sixth Amendment might be the theoretical repository of a
discriminatory peremptory challenge even if the allegedly discriminatory exclusion was not
intentional.
61. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 482-83 (1990).
62. Tetlow, supra note 15, at 164.
63. Id.
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antibalkanization perspective, it is difficult to see why this would constitute
an affront to anyone. Why should whites, for example, experience insult
from a rule that says blacks cannot be systematically removed from the jury,
or vice versa? Indeed, such a rule, and the juries selected under it, would
seem to promote rather than destroy social cohesion. Hence, specifically in
regard to discriminatory peremptories, antibalkanization seems a potentially
promising fit with a modified version of Tetlow's formulation of the notion
of an "impartial" jury representing a "fair" cross-section of society.
Equally important, housing the objection to discriminatory
peremptories in the Sixth Amendment could have the advantage of taking
the spotlight off of the blame or fault of the striker. The Sixth Amendment
is not saddled with the Equal Protection Clause's present theoretical
restrictions. As a result, here, using the suggested understanding of the Sixth
Amendment and considering the previous antibalkanization discussion, a
reviewing court's focus could be directed to the result (whether the jury is
impartial and includes a fair cross-section) rather than to the striking actor's
mental state (whether the attorney intended to produce a racially slanted
jury).64 Applying the antibalkanization principle through the conduit of the
Sixth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause could thereby
avoid the previously identified problematic implications for equal protection
theory more generally, which as it currently stands, seems to require blame
6
and fault. 5

All of this is not to say that the Sixth Amendment is the right or best fix
for the dilemma of discriminatory peremptory challenges, or that the
suggested formulation of it is ultimately defensible. Rather, this Essay raises
this point only to capitalize on the antibalkanization notion and offer the
possibility that there may be alternatives to an unsatisfactory Equal
Protection Clause resolution of this seemingly intractable problem first
addressed twenty-five years ago in Batson.
IV. CONCLUSION

A Batson equal protection violation ruling is equivalent to an accusation
of moral wrongdoing. As such, it could be counterproductive to the quest
for elimination of discriminatory peremptory challenges. Blame is not
constructive here. On the contrary, the possible disinclination to label
attorneys as racists and liars could ultimately be contributing to the apparent
dearth of Batson-violation findings. The effective safe haven for
unconstitutional conduct created by the paucity of Batson-violation rulings is

64. See supra note 6o. Eliminating a requirement of "intentional" exclusion hopefully
results in moving the focus from the motivation of the excluder to the fact of the exclusion.
65. On the other hand, the blame problem identified here may indeed be an obstacle to
the efficacy of the equal protection guarantee as it is more broadly applied. Perhaps a
realignment of equal protection away from blame would prove to be beneficial generally.
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a perverse incentive, essentially condoning rather than condemning the
practice of discriminatory peremptories.
A major impediment to addressing this problem is the fact that the
prevailing equal protection theory-anticlassification-essentially assumes
fault-based, blameworthy action. Under current law, it seems impossible to
rule that an actor has violated the Equal Protection Clause without accusing
him or her of immoral conduct. Unfortunately, the sometimes-touted
alternative equal protection theory-antisubordination-results in a similar,
possibly even stronger, imputation of blame. Neither theory is likely to
remedy the problem of blame under Batson.
A recently identified antibalkanization principle of equal protection
asserts that avoiding divisiveness and promoting social cohesion is the
essence of this constitutional guarantee. If substituted as the governing rule,
it might allow for finding unconstitutional discriminatory peremptory
challenges without implicating personal fault or blame. Nevertheless, it is
not clear that antibalkanization holds any particular claim to be the
authoritative understanding of the Constitution's equal protection
assurance.
The antibalkanization principle, however, seems to comport well with
the Sixth Amendment's requirement of an impartial jury comprised of a fair
cross-section of the community. So understood, the Sixth Amendment might
provide an alternative avenue for insuring against discriminatory
peremptory challenges. Moreover, using the Sixth Amendment in this way to
address the peremptories problem, instead of the Equal Protection Clause,
could well avoid the imputation of blame. Unlike an equal protection
violation under current law, a Sixth Amendment violation could be found in
a challenged-peremptories case without focusing on the motivation of the
striking attorney, but rather concentrating solely on the result of the strike.
The Sixth Amendment, interpreted through an antibalkanization lens, thus
potentially allows for a finding of unconstitutional peremptory challenges
without raising the unfortunate and unproductive specter of blame.

